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NOTES
RELIGIOUS CONSIDERATIONS IN AWARDING CUSTODY
OF CHILDREN
In a case now before the Supreme Court of Iowa 1 the question was
presented as to whether a mother, who was a Protestant, could be compelled
to raise her child, of whom she was awarded custody, in the Roman Catholic
faith because of an agreement between her and her former husband that was
incorporated in the divorce decree. The purpose of this note will be to examine the position of the Pennsylvania courts on the question of religion in
awarding custody.
Pennsylvania, Professor Freedman points out, is the only jurisdiction that
forbids deciding the question of custody in the divorce proceeding itself.'
Thus the problem of a religion being specified in the divorce decree cannot
possibly arise in Pennsylvania since it would totally exceed the power of the
court. In order to decide this issue, which is not infrequently of paramount
importance to everyone concerned, it is necessary to bring a habeas corpus
proceeding.' The question, therefore, is just what regard should be had for
religion by the court that takes jurisdiction of the habeas corpus proceeding.
Clearly it would 'be a deplorable practice for any court to act in a manner
which would tend to create a legal preference for any religious group, and such
action would doubtless be declared unconstitutional by either the Pennsylvania
or the federal courts because of the constitutional provisions covering such
matters.4 On the other hand, for clearly apparent reasons, it would be equally
abominable to proceed with no concern whatsoever for the spiritual welfare
of the child. To ignore religious considerations completely would clearly not
be in the best interests of society. The courts in this commonwealth seem to
be in complete agreement that such matters must be carefully considered when
1 Lynch v. Uhlenhoop.

This case was not decided at the time of this writing.

2 FREEDMAN, LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN PENNSYLVANIA

§

717 (1939).

3 Gard Appeal, 356 Pa. 378, 52 A.2d 313 (1947).
4 The United States Constitution in Article I provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; . . .
The Constitution of Pennsylvania recites in Section 3: "All men have a natural and indefeasible
right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own conscience; no man can of
right be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry
against his consent; no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the
rights of conscience and no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious establishments
or modes of worship."
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called upon to decide custody of a child. Judge Wright of Pennsylvania's
Superior Court has recently stated:
"Religion is an important matter and should be given consideration, but
it does not determine the right of custody." 5
This language seems to enunciate the trend which is apparent in all the
decisions in this jurisdiction.
The general consideration used in awarding custody is the welfare of the
child. In Pennsylvania the legislature has decreed that in deciding questions
of custody the courts should consider the matter from the viewpoint of what
would best serve the welfare of the child.' It is unquestionably true that
religious guidance is essential to the welfare of a child. In Butcher's Estate
the court pointed out:
"The welfare of the child must remain the primary consideration to which
all other questions must yield. Its interest is paramount and the court must
consider not only the spiritual and temporal welfare but the minor's further
training, education and morals, and the ability of the proposed guardian to
to best take care of the child in each and all of these respects."
Obviously, therefore, the religious well being of the child must be considered, but still the problem of just what weight should be attributed thereto
arises.
In the case of Commonwealth ex rel. Stack v. Stack 8 the court seems to
have put considerable emphasis on the faith in which the children were baptized. In this case the mother had custody of the children, who were baptized
in the Roman Catholic faith, and educated in that religious persuasion for
some years. The mother had also agreed to accept that faith at the time of
her marriage but was, after the separation, training the children in the Protestant faith. The Superior Court adopted the statement of the trial judge that
the children should continue to pursue their Roman Catholic education until
they were old enough to decide such matters for themselves. A case some
years earlier appears to have reached a different decision. In Commonwealth
ex rel. Kelley v. Kelley ' the father was a Roman Catholic and the mother was
a Protestant. The lower court's order placed the child in the custody of his
father on the theory that since he had been baptized a Roman Catholic it
5 Corn. ex tel. Donie v. Ferree, 175 Pa. Super. 586, 106 A.2d 681 (1954).
6 Act of June 26, 1895, P.L. 316, § 2, PURION'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 92.
7 266 Pa. 479, 109 Atl. 683 (1920), per Frazer, J.
8 141 Pa. Super. 147, 15 A.2d 76 (1940).
9 Corn. ex rel. Kelley v. Kelley, 83 Pa. Super. 14 (1924).
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was now incumbent that he be brought up in that persuasion.
Court reversed this order and in so doing noted:
"There is nothing in the law that requires this

....

The Superior

There is no reason

why a child should be given to either parent solely because of such parent's
adherence to a particular sect. If the permanent welfare of the child would
be best conserved by awarding it to the care of its mother, the fact that the
child, at the instance of the father, was baptized by a Catholic priest would
not be a determining factor."
In a case which is considerably more recent than either the Stack 10 or
Kelley " cases, Commonwealth ex rel Kuntz v. Stackhouse,12 the parents of
the child in question had been murdered and the paternal grandmother and a
maternal aunt and her husband both sought custody of the child. The trial
court concluded that the moral fitness and material advantages of both homes
were equal and based his decision on religion and relationship.13 The appellate
court, evidently feeling that it was best to have the child reside some distance
from the scene of the atrocious and evidently highly publicized murders, reversed the lower court and went on to say:
"We have no concern with committing the child to any particular creed
or denomination. Our sole concern is that the home to which we assign it
shall provide proper spiritual and material benefits and blessings."
All of the foregoing cases stress the importance the courts place on the
welfare of the child. However, in the Kelley 1' and Stack "5cases the litigation

involved the child's parents and in the Kuntz " case the parents were both
deceased and the litigation was between close relatives. This raises the question of just what the outcome would be if the litigation were between a parent
of one religious conviction and an outsider or lesser relative of some other
spiritual opinion. The case of Commonwealth ex tel. Shamenck v. Allen "
covers this problem fully. In that case the mother had custody of a child when
she suffered a fatal heart attack; at that time a maternal aunt, a Protestant,
took the child to live with her. The aunt was educating her in the Protestant
faith. The father, a Roman Catholic, wished to obtain custody. However, it
seems that the child was quite frightened of him probably because of somewhat
10 See note 8 supra.

11 See note 9 supra.
12 176 Pa. Super. 361, 108 A.2d 73 (1954).
13 Ross, J., pointed out that the trial judge correctly recognized that no statute requires that a
child's custody be given to one of the same religious creed as that of the parent who baptized the
child. Nevertheless, the trial court was of the opinion that the requirement of the Adoption Code
was applicable by analogy and awarded custody on this analogy. This was error.
14 See note 8 supra.
15 See note 9 supra.
26 See note 12 supra.
17 179 Pa. Super. 155 (1955).
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violent arguments she overheard when the parents were living together. President Judge Smith wrote the lower court opinion 18 and described several instances in which the child displayed fright when she was in the presence of
her father. Both President Judge Smith of Dauphin County and Judge Ervin
of the Superior Court recognized that ordinarily a parent is entitled to the
custody of his child, but they both, in very excellent opinions, realized that it
would not be a wise decision to gamble with the welfare and happiness of this
child even despite the differences in religious viewpoints. Obviously this case
puts strong emphasis on the welfare of the child.
In summary, it appears that the courts of Pennsylvania are more concerned
with the welfare of the child than they are with seeing it raised in any particular religious group. Nevertheless, they clearly recognize the fact that some
sort of religious up-bringing is not only necessary but is, in fact, essential to
the welfare of the child and to the interests of society as a whole. The moral
and material benefits of the person to whom the child is to be awarded are
of the utmost importance, but religious training is considered also although it
alone will not determine who will get custody of the child. In reference to
this, the faith in which a child has been baptized and instructed is often quite
important. Perhaps the whole problem is best summed up in these words:
"The paramount consideration in cases of this nature is at all times the
welfare of the child, which includes its physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual well-being, and all other considerations are subordinate." 19
FRANK S. SEIDERS, JR.
18 The lower court opinion appears in 67 Dauph. 313 (1954).
19 Ross, J., in Corn. ex rel. Kuntz v. Stackhouse. See note 10 supra.

